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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NED 0. GREGERSON and DIXIE ) 
GREGERSON. his wife, ) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
JAMES L. JENSEN and NEDRA 
JENSEN, his wife, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18354 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case was initially tried to Don V. Tibbs, 
sitting without a jury. At the completion of 
Plaintiffs' case, that Court granted judgment in favor 
of Defendants on Plaintiffs' complaint for specific 
performance, no cause of action. That decision was 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which reversed and 
granted Plaintiffs a new trial (Case No. 16339, filed 
September 4th, 1980; 617 P2d 369). The case was 
assigned to the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen for 
retrial. At the Pre-Trial Conference, the parties 
stipulated to the use of the trial transcript of the 
first trial, and the wife of Plaintiff-Appellant, Dixie 
Gregerson, was joined as a party plaintiff. At the 
second trial, Judge Sorensen granted judgment against 
Plaintiffs as to their request for specific 
performance, but granted judgment in favor of 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiffs as against Defendants in the sum of $350.00 
plus interest at the legal rate from September 30th, 
1971, and costs of court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing 
the judgment of the trial court and a ruling that as a 
matter of law, the agreement reached between Plaintiffs 
and Defendants is specifically enforceable and awarding 
to Plaintiffs the real property as more specifically 
described in a deed designated as Exhibit 7, free and 
clear of any and all encumbrance on said property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 29th, 1971, the Plaintiff and 
Appellant, Ned O. Gregerson, hereinafter referred to as 
GREGERSON, met with the Defendant James L. Jensen, 
hereinafter referred to as JENSEN, at a service station 
located in Gunnison, Utah, which was managed by Jensen. 
While at the station, Gregerson, who was with his 
father, asked Jensen if he would sell a piece of 
property Jensen owned in Gunnison, Utah. (First trial 
transcript, hereinafter referred to as Tl· I Tl 
12:1-17; 45:25-30; 46:6-16; 47:1-10; 11A:19-30; 
48:5-19). Jensen indicated he was interested in the 
sale. (Tl 12: 2-9). 
3 
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After this initial conversation at Jensen's place 
of business, Gregerson, his father and Jensen went to 
the property in question which is a parcel of 
unimproved real property located directly in back of 
Jensen's home in Gunnison, Utah. (Tl 26:10-14). The 
parties there viewed the land and continued 
negotiations. The property which the parties stood 
upon was enclosed by fences on all four sides. (Tl 
37:24-30). Thus a fence separated the subject property 
from Jensen's home. The property at that time was 
being used as a pasture by Jensen. (Tl 38: 8-9) • The 
real property in question was immediately adjacent to 
the community hospital and Gregerson indicated his 
desire to locate a dental clinic upon it. 
While the parties were upon the property, Jensen 
informed Gregerson that he would not sell the entire 
area because he needed adequate room for a cesspool and 
drain fields. (Tl 46: 10-11; 4 7: 4-6). Gregerson agreed 
to this request made by Jensen. 
Also while the parties were on the subject 
property, a conversation took place wherein Jensen told 
Gregerson that he would sell his property north of 
where he kicked the dirt (Tl 48:11-15). The parties at 
that time agreed to a total purchase price of $700.00 
for the subject property. (Tl 12:2-9; 48:18-19). 
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After Gregerson and Jensen reached this agreement, 
Jensen returned to the service station. Gregerson and 
his father then went to a local contractor to 
investigate potential building plans. (Tl 13:3-20). 
On the following morning, Gregerson went to 
Jensen's house. Present at that time was Plaintiff, 
Ned O. Gregerson, his father, Owen Gregerson, his 
mother, Edna Gregerson, Defendant, James L. Jensen and 
Defendant, Edra Jensen. (Tl 69:22-25). At that time, 
Gregerson delivered to Jensen a check in the sum of 
$350. 00 representing one-half of the purchase price. 
(Tl 17:23-30; see Exhibit No. 1). On the face of the 
check, in the handwriting of Gregerson, is the 
following language in the lower left-hand corner: 
"1/2 payment on land as agreed -
other 1/2 payment when deed delivered." 
The check for $350.00 was endorsed by Jensen and 
deposited in the joint bank account of J. L. Jensen and 
Edra Jensen, his wife. {Tl 60:16-22; second trial 
transcript hereinafter T2; T2 11:6-12). Jensen has had 
the use of that money since September, 1971. In 
addition, Gregerson, at the time this action was filed, 
tendered the balance in the sum of $350.00 to the Clerk 
of Sanpete County. 
5 
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\, 
Jensen readily admits that he and Gregerson came 
to an agreement for the sale of the land and shook 
hands evidencing that agreement (T2 21:2-10). 
Q. (by Mr. Chamberlain) Isn't it true 
that at that time you thought that by accepting 
the check and endorsing it and delivering the 
deed that you and Mr. Gregerson had in fact 
come to an agreement? 
A. (by James L. Jensen) We did come 
to an agreement. We shook hands. He was 
going to be up on the first of the year to 
build. He was going to build a retaining 
fence, build an Amway warehouse and retire 
me in five years and a nice dental clinic 
that would make my property look nice. 
While all parties were present at the house, 
Gregerson mentioned his concern about the property's 
legal description and whether James Jensen's wife, 
Edra, had an interest in the property. (Tl 15:7-8; 
24-30). By reason of that inquiry, Edra Jensen gave to 
Gregerson a Tax Valuation Notice which contained a 
description of both the unimproved area and the 
adjacent lot upon which the Jensen house was located. 
(Tl 15:7-8; 24-30; T2 33:14-21; see Exhibit No. 2, copy 
a 
of Tax Notice) . Said Tax Notice was in the name of 
James Jensen only. 
After the check was delivered to Jensen, Jensen 
told Gregerson that he (Jensen) would get a Release of 
Mortgage from the local banker, Cy Anderson, would get 
a deed made out for Gregerson and when that had been 
accomplished, Gregerson would be required to send the 
6 
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balance due in the sum of $350.00. Jensen told 
Gregerson that he would get that done the first part of 
the next week. (Tl 19:20-30; 20:1-2). The check that 
Gregerson delivered to Jensen named James Jensen only 
? 
inasmuch as the parties acknowledged that said 
Defendant held sole interest in the land. (Tl 15:27; 
19:18-19). In connection with record title, the 
parties stipulated that record title was only in the 
name of Defendant, James L. Jensen both at the time 
this transaction took place as well as at the present 
time. A certified copy of the deed whereby Jensen 
received title in his name only to the subject property 
was received by the Court at the second trial (Exhibit 
No. 8) . 
At the second trial, an unrecorded Conditional 
Sales Contract dated January 15, 1950, between Elnora 
Jensen as Seller and James L. Jensen and Edra C. Jensen 
as Buyers was received by the Court (Exhibit 10). 
Likewise, the court received as evidence an unrecorded 
Warranty Deed dated January 15, 1950 from James L. 
Jensen as Granter to Edra C. Jensen as Grantee 
(Exhibit 9). Even though both documents were 
unrecorded, the court ruled as a matter of law that 
"The record deed at the conunencement of this action was 
in Edra C. Jensen .•. " (See Conclusion of Law No. 3). 
The record is absolutely clear that Gregerson was never 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
told of these unrecorded instruments even upon inquiry 
by Gregerson when the Tax Notice was prodeced. Thus 
Gregerson made the check payable only to "Jay Jensen". 
After the meeting at the house concluded, 
Gregerson, his father and Don Anderson, a local 
contractor, returned to the property in question to 
determine if it was large enough to accommodate an 
office building and parking lot. (Tl 38:24-26; 
64:26-29; T2 29:15-24). Defendant Jensen was present 
at that time and in his presence, Gregerson, his father 
and Don Anderson, using the description on the Tax 
Valuation Notice, measured the pastured area, excluding 
the land which Jensen indicated he needed for a 
cesspool and drain fields. The result of these 
measurements indicated that the existing fence 
accurately bordered the Jensen property. (Tl 36:25-30; 
37:1-30; 38:1-30; 39:1-10; 64:26-39). At that time, at 
least one iron state was placed on the corner of the 
property. (Tl 64:30; 65:11-23). 
Jensen testified at the second trial that he was 
not present while the measurements of the property were 
made. However, in the transcript of the first trial at 
page 54, the following questions and answers were 
exchanged: 
Q. {by Mr. Chamberlain) Do you recall 
being at the property -- I think you have probably 
already testified to this -- when Don Anderson 
8 
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came and measured the property? 
A. (by James L. Jensen) I can't remember 
being there when Don was but if Don said I was 
there, Don is an honest man because I must have 
lost track because I didn't help with any chaining 
or anything like that. 
Q. And you don't know whether Don Anderson 
was there at that time or not? 
A. He might have come in. I don't know and 
he's an honest man and if he said he was there, 
and he said I was there, and so I just can't 
remember whether he came with Owen or Ned, when 
Owen and Ned and myself was there or not. 
Don Anderson testified that Jensen was present (Tl 
37: 13-15). 
After the measurements were taken Gregerson went 
to several local banks to determine if he could obtain 
a construction loan (Tl 20:12-23). Initially, 
Gregerson was turned down by one bank, but finally 
' 
located financing at the bank 1n Salina. Gregerson 
then returned to the service station managed by Jensen 
and told him that he could get the loan, but that he 
would need Jensen to obtain a Release of Mortgage and 
would need the deed prepared and delivered to him 
pursuant to their agreement. 
Jensen had initially told Gregerson that he had an 
outstanding mortgage on the property, but told 
Gregerson that he was sure the bank would release the 
mortgage on the pasture portion of the property as he 
had done in a previous transaction of a similar nature. 
(Tl 12:10-17; 49:21-22). At the second trial, Jensen 
9 
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also testified that he could obtain a Release of 
Mortgage on the subject property (T2 20:6-10). 
Gregerson then left Gunnison, Utah and returned to 
Texas to complete his military obligation. When 
Gregerson did not receive the deed from Jensen for two 
weeks thereafter, Gregerson telephoned Jensen and 
inquired about the delay. Jensen explained that he had 
simply failed to get the deed but assured Gregerson 
that he would take care of the matter immediately. (Tl 
21:2-9). 
Gregerson thereafter called Jensen during the 
first part of November of that year to see why he had 
not received the deed (Tl 21:10-15) but was never told 
by Jensen that a deed had been prepared and delivered 
to the bank even though it had been just two days after 
the agreement was made and the first half of the 
purchase price paid. Gregerson made other inquiries of 
Jensen thereafter, but Jensen failed to respond and 
deliver the deed. Unknown to Gregerson at the time of 
the first trial, a deed was prepared relating to the 
property in question and delivered to the local bank. 
{Tl 48:21-29; 49:26-27; 50:23-29). A copy of the deed 
was received by this court at the second trial (Exhibit 
1). 
Jensen .testified that the father of Ned O. 
Gregerson, Owen Gregerson, delivered the deed to him 
10 
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about two days after the conversation at Jensen's home 
where the check for $350.00 was delivered (T2 7:13-29). 
Jensen took the deed to his banker in Gunnison since he 
apparently recognized the need to obtain a release of 
mortgage (T2 7:30; 8:1-4). 
An analysis of the deed indicates a detailed 
description, shows James L. Jensen and Nedra Jensen, 
his wife, as Granters and Ned 0. Gregerson and Dixie C. 
Gregerson, his wife, as joint tenants, with full rights 
of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, as 
Grantees. The deed is dated the " day of October, 
1971." At the time of the first trial, Jensen 
testified that the only reasons he did not sign the 
deed and deliver it to Gregerson were the misspelling 
of his wife's name ("Nedra" instead of "Edra") and the 
advice of the local banker, Cy Anderson, that Jensen 
should await the arrival of Gregerson before signing 
the document and delivering it. (Tl 50:27-30; 51:1-4; 
and 21-25; 52:21-30; 53:1-25). Jensen also testified 
that the banker recognized the misspelling of Edra 
Jensen's name and that the deed .could be changed (T2 
8:29-30; 9:1-4). Jensen further testified at the 
second trial that he thought that by accepting the 
check and endorsing it that he agreed to the terms of 
the sale, i.e., delivery of the deed when the full 
payment was made, (T2 21:2-14) but that he now takes 
11 
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the position that he has changed his mind and claims 
that he was not required to deliver the deed until 
Gregerson came and constructed the building upon the 
subject property. Of course, Gregerson could not start 
any construction nor could he obtain a loan until the 
deed was delivered and a Release of Mortgage obtained. 
(See also Tl 51:21-30; 52:1-6). 
Concerning ownership of the land itself, Jensens 
have adrni tted in their Amended Answer that "James L. 
Jensen and Ned O. Gregerson negotiated in regard to a 
contract for a sale of real prqperty " • • • • 
Furthermore, Defendant, Jensen, testified that the only 
property he owned in Gunnison, Utah was his home and 
the property behind it. (Tl 44:6-13). Jensen further 
testified that he did not own any other property in 
Gunnison, Utah. (Tl 44: 10-13) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SEVERAL WRITINGS MAY BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER 
AS CONTAINING ALL TERMS OF A CONTRACT FOR A 
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT SIGNED BY THE PARTY 
TO BE CHARGED. 
It is the position of Plaintiffs that this Court 
has directly ruled in favor of Plaintiffs at the time 
of the first appeal. In Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P2d 
12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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369 (Utah 1980), the Court, after outlining the facts, 
stated: 
"This Court has previously held that 
several writings may be construed 
together as containing all the terms 
of a contract for the sale of real 
property, notwithstanding the fact 
that they are not all signed by the 
party to be charged. Where more than 
one writing is used to satisfy the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, 
however some nexus between the writing 
must be shown. This requirement may 
be satisfied either by express refer-
ence in the signed writing to the un-
signed one, or by implied reference 
gleaned from the contents of the writings 
and the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. In the latter instance, 
parol evidence may be used to connect 
an unsigned document to one that has 
been signed by the person to be charged. 
As explained in Good v. Payne Furniture 
Co.: 
"A memorandum consisting of 
several signed and unsigned 
writings will satisfy the 
Statute of Fraud so long as 
those writings clearly refer 
to the same subject matter or 
transaction. Parol evidence 
will be considered if it con-
vincingly shows that the signed 
and unsigned writings are con-
nected to one another and have 
been assented to by the parties." 
In the present case, the check which 
Gregerson delivered to Jensen, who endorsed 
it and deposited the proceeds in his 
joint checking account, was inscribed by 
Gregerson with the notation: "1/2 payment 
on land as agreed - other 1/2 payment when 
deed delivered." Thus while not referring 
expressly to a specific deed, the notation 
on the check evidences the expectations of 
the parties that a deed would be involved 
in the transaction. Added to this implied 
13 
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\ 
reference to the newly discovered deed or 
the contents of that deed which expressly 
refer to the parties in question and 
specifically describe the subject matter 
property." 
The Court further elaborated in ruling for 
Plaintiff as follows: 
"Considering the implied reference found 
in the signed writing, the contents of the 
deed, the fact the deed was in the custody 
) of the bank within a few days after the delivery of part-payment, and Jensen's 
acknowledgment of the propriety of the 
deed, we believe the true writings evidence 
a single transaction and should be read 
together as fulfilling the requirements 
of the Statute of Frauds. 
If the writings are united as one memorandum 
of the contract then the deficiency of an 
inadequate designation of the property to 
be conveyed is eliminated and cannot be 
relied upon to deny specific performance." 
At the risk of citing what was apparently obvious 
to the Court at the time of the ruling on the first 
appeal, the Court should also be directed to the 
language cited with approval in that decision as being 
the underlying logic in this area of the law. The 
Court cited with approval, Ha spray v. Pasarelli, 79 
Nev. 203, 380 P2d 919 (1963); as explained in Flegel v. 
Dowling, 54 Or. 40, 102 P. 178 (909): 
" ..• when all writings adduced, 
viewed together in light of the 
situation and circumstances of the 
parties at the time they were written, 
show unmistakably that they relate to 
the same matter, and constitute several 
parts of one connected transaction, so 
that the mind can come to no other 
14 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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reasonable conclusion from the evidence 
so offered than that they were each 
written with reference to those con-
current or preceding, then there is 
such a reference of the one to the 
other as satisfies the rule, although 
reference in express terms does not 
appear. The rule is one founded on 
reason; and when as practical men, we 
look at the writings, and see inhering 
in them evidence which entirely satis-
fies the mind that they all relate to one 
general transaction, there is no reason 
why they should not be so construed. 
There is in such a case a direct refer-
ence of the one to the other within the 
meaning of the law." at 181-182. 
(Quoting from White v. Breen, 106 Ala. 
159, 19 Southern 59 (1894); see gener-
ally 81 A.L.R.2d 991. 
It appears therefore that this Court has ruled on 
the very issue concerning the Statute of Fraud defense 
relied upon by Defendants. This Court's decision is 
the latest statement by the Utah Supreme Court, and 
clearly manifests that Plaintiff indeed made out a 
prima facie case for specific performance. By reason 
of the first appeal, this Court apparently remanded the 
case for a new trial because the newly discovered deed 
had not been received in evidence by the first trier of 
fact. In the second trial, the Court received as 
evidence the newly discovered deed, but ruled it and 
the endorsed check did not constitute sufficient 
memorandum to meet the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds, even in light of this Court's ruling. Since 
the Supreme Court has apparently ruled that a prirna 
15 
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facie case for specific performance was established, 
the second trial court should have determined if the 
evidence submitted by Defendants at the second trial in 
any way overcame the prima facie case established by 
Plaintiffs. A careful reading of the second trial 
transcript indicates that Defendants did not in any way 
rebut the facts as established by the transcript of the 
first trial, nor the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs 
at the second trial. 
POINT II. 
TO RENDER THE CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE WOULD 
BE TO PERPETRATE A FRAUD ON PLAINTIFF. 
The purpose of the Statutes of Fraud has long been 
recognized that its purpose is to prevent the 
perpetration of a fraud. 
Plaintiff's principal attack on the 
judgment of the trial court involves 
the application of the Statute of 
Frauds. His contention is that the 
statutes prohibits the original con-
tract from being declared valid and 
binding on the original signers. We 
approach this question by directing 
attention to the principal that the 
statute should be used for the purpose 
of preventing fraud and not as a shield 
by which fraud can be perpetrated. 
Jacobson v. Cox, 202 P2d 714 (Utah 1949). 
Had Gregerson tendered to Jensen cash instead of 
the check, the Statutes of Frauds would likely have 
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direct application. In Hunter v. Wetsel, 84 N.Y. 549 
(1881) the Court states: 
The purpose and object of the statute 
should not be forgotten. Its aim is to 
substitute some act for mere words, to 
compel the verbal contract to be accom-
panied by some fact not likely to be 
mistaken, and so avoid the dangers of 
treacherous memory or down right perjury. 
The delivery of the check was such an act. 
The giving of a check is an overt act 
much easily proved, and less susceptible 
to misconstruction or perjury than the 
payment of a sum in currency. It is 
objected that a draft or check of a 
debtor is only conditional payment, and 
not satisfaction of the debt for which 
it is given, in absence of some agreement 
to the contrary. That, it is submitted, 
has nothing to do with the application of 
the Statutes of Frauds. The statute is not 
concerned with the legal affect of the pay-
ment; it says nothing about the payment 
being unsatisfaction, wholly or in part, 
of the vendor's claim. The purpose of the 
Statutes of Frauds is fully satisfied by 
the physical delivery of the instrument, 
the overt act indicating that there was a 
bargain between the parties. {Emphasis 
added) . 
POINT III. 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS A SUFFICIENT DESCRIP-
TION BASED ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES 
IN THE EVENT IT DISREGARDS THE LEGAL 
DESCRIPTION FOUND UPON THE DEED. 
Gregerson and Jensen both acknowledged that they 
went to the real property in question that was behind 
Jensen's house and that Jensen "kicked the ground" as 
to where the point of beginning was to be. 
Furthermore, the property was enclosed on all four 
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sides by a fence, with one section of the fence 
separating the subject property from Jensen's home. 
The unsigned and undated deed accurately describes the 
subject property, and appears to have been done by 
someone with ski 11 and competence in land surveying. 
In addition, a comparison between Exhibit 8 (the 
Warranty Deed from Jensen's mother to James L. Jensen), 
and Exhibit 7 (the Warranty Deed from Defendants to 
Plaintiffs) , would allow a reasonable mind to determine 
the land which was the subject of the transaction. 
Even without a comparison of the deeds, however, the 
Court can determine from the actions of the parties as 
to the amount of proper~y which Jensen agreed to sell 
to Gregerson. In Jacobson v. Cox, 202 P2d, 714, (Utah 
1949) the court states: 
"Plaintiff's next attack revolves 
around the claim that the original 
contract is unenforceable because the 
property is not described with cer-
tainty and definiteness. We overrule 
this contention. People who reside in 
far away rural communities cannot be 
charged with unreasonable accuracy in 
describing unsurveyed land. The only 
reasonable means by which a person can 
describe property located on a public 
domain, and which has never been surveyed, 
is by reference to natural monuments. 
The original parties to the contract 
could not have described the land by 
metes and bounds without going to the 
expense of running a survey. They 
apparently considered this unnecessary 
as all parties knew the exact location 
of the property involved; had been 
familiar with, and used it for many 
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years; had described it in all documents 
by reference to fences, natural monuments, 
size and occupancy. In spite of the 
misdescriptions in the record, the 
original owners knew and the present 
litigants know the location of the 
piece of property in dispute." 
(Emphasis added) . 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT EDRA JENSEN IS BARRED BY LAW 
FROM CLAIMING A STATUTORY DOWER RIGHT. 
In 1975, the Uniform Probate Code was adopted by 
the State of Utah. As part of the revision in the 
probate law, the legislature abolished both the estates 
of dower and curtesy. Section 75-2-113, UCA, provides 
as follows: 
"Dower and curtesy Abolished. - The 
estates of dower and curtesy are 
abolished." 
The Utah Supreme Court has yet to determine the 
constitutionality of the statute quoted above, and thus 
until challenged, that law is controlling. 
Furthermore, it is elementary law that a wife's 
dower interest does not vest until the death of her 
husband. Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 P. 680 (1921); 
Boise Cascade Corporation v. Meyer. 568 P2d 755 (Utah 
1977). In Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 U. 360, 88 P. 20 
(Utah 1906), the court ruled that dower, as an 
interest, was subject to the control of legislative 
power, and therefore, until it vested by the death of 
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the husband, the legislature could modify, abrogate, 
increase, or diminish it at its pleasure. 
Thus, Defendant Edra Jensen, did not need to join 
in the conveyance of the real property to Gregerson 
because she does not have a dower right. In addition, 
( 1) she did not own any record title in the subject 
property; ( 2) the transactions, which are the subject 
of this matter, took place, at least in part, in her 
presence; (3) she delivered the Tax Notice to Gregerson 
which indicated that the property was only in the name 
of her husband, James L. Jensen; (4) the check in the 
sum of $350.00 was deposited into the joint account of 
James L. Jensen and Edra Jensen, his wife, and 
therefore subject to withdrawal in full by either of 
said parties; (5) the Warranty Deed was prepared for 
her signature and Defendant James L. Jensen was willing 
to submit it to her for her signature, save and except 
her name was misspelled and his banker advised him to 
wait until Gregerson returned to the area and (6) she 
made no mention of documents which conveyed title to 
her, if in fact she knew of these documents. 
POINT V. 
A NEXUS EXISTS BETWEEN THE REAL PROPERTY 
WHICH THE PARTIES STOOD UPON AND NEGOTI-
ATED AND THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION FOUND ON 
THE WARRANTY DEED. 
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The record of the second trial indicates some 
concern on the part of the trier of fact that there was 
no evidence indicating that the real property which the 
parties walked upon and discussed was the same real 
property described in the Warranty Deed. In answer to 
the court's concern, the record and exhibits in this 
matter indicate as follows: 
1. Defendants admit by their Amended Answer 
that Plaintiff and Defendants had negotiations for 
the real property owned by Defendants as described 
in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
2. The only real property owned by 
Defendants is their home in Gunnison, Utah and 
the adjacent "pasture property". 
3. That property was measured, in the 
presence of Defendant J. Jensen, stakes were 
pounded, and Jensen even indicated the portion 
that he needed to reserve for his own use. 
4. Jensen testified at both the first 
and second trials that he and Gregerson had 
.. 
reached an agreement concerning that particu-
lar parcel of land for the purchase price of 
$700.00. 
5. A check for one-half of the purchase 
price was delivered by Gregerson to Jensen the 
day after the parties reached that aareement. 
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6. Within a matter of days, a deed was 
prepared by a party apparently unknown to 
Plaintiff and Defendant. In any event, the deed 
ended up in the hands of Defendant James L. 
Jensen, who in turn delivered the deed to the 
bank, indicated his willingness to sign the 
same, save and except the misspelling of his 
wife's name and the advice of a local banker 
to await the return of Gregerson. Certainly 
if Jensen objected to the legal description 
found upon that deed, he took no exception to 
the same and even indicated his willingness to 
sign the same. 
If Plaintiff is to obtain specific performance in 
this case, the legal description for that land must, by 
implication, come from the deed itself. If the check 
and the deed are to be read together as constituting a 
memorandum which satisfies the Statute of Frauds, then 
the deed, chargeable to the Defendant by his possession 
and delivery, must be read as constituting the 
description upon which Plaintiff and Defendant agreed. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT SHOULD DECREE SPECIFIC PERFORM-
ANCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND REQUIRE 
DEFENDANT TO DEED THE REAL PROPERTY 
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DESCRIBED IN THE WARRANTY DEED TO PLAINTIFF 
FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY AND ALL ENCUMBRANCE, 
INCLUDING THE MORTGAGE ON SAID PROPERTY. 
The first trial in the above-entitled matter was 
held on September 27th, 1978. In 1971, when Plaintiff 
and Defendant negotiated concerning this matter, 
Defendant James L. Jensen indicated that he had a 
mortgage on the subject property, but that he would 
have no difficulty in obtaining a release of the same. 
Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on August 16th, 1977, 
and poth Defendants were served on August 24th, 1977. 
From that time forward, both Defendants had notice of 
Plaintiff's claim to Defendants' property and that in 
the event Plaintiff prevailed, Defendants would be 
required to convey the real property specified in 
Plaintiff's Complaint and to obtain a Release of 
Mortgage on the· same at the time of delivery. However, 
just nine days prior to the first trial on this matter, 
the Defendants, with full knowledge of this pending 
litigation and knowing that the trial was scheduled for 
September 27th, 1978, intentionally increased the 
mortgage on the subject property to $12,000.00. 
Plaintiff maintains that this was an attempt on 
the part of Defendants to perpetrate a fraud so that in 
the event Plaintiff did in fact prevail, it would be 
difficult to obtain the same Release of Mortgage 
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Defendants had previously committed to obtain and thus 
thwart the good faith effort of Plaintiff. 
At the time of the first trial when Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's counsel learned that Defendants had 
intentionally increased the mortgage on the property, a 
Lis Pendens was thereafter filed during the first 
appeal process. 
' By reason of the increase of the mortgage by 
Defendants, Plaintiffs thereafter amended their 
Complaint to ask the court to order Defendants to 
convey the real property described in the Warranty Deed 
to Plaintiff free and clear of any and all encumbrances 
and specifically the increased mortgage. 
At the second trial before this court, Defendant 
Jensen testified that the unpaid balance of that 
mortgage was approximately $10,000.00 and that the 
value of his home was in the neighborhood of 
'·/' 
$40,000.00. Thus, there appears to be ample equity in 
the subject property whereby Defendants could in fact 
obtain a Release of Mortgage and convey to Plaintiff 
said real property free and clear. Defendant James L. 
Jensen agreed initially to release said mortgage and 
convey said property free and clear to Plaintiff; 
likewise, he should now be obligated to honor that 
commitment and do what he promised to do in the first 
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place. To rule otherwise would be to allow Defendant 
to perpetrate a fraud against Plaintiff and the court. 
POINT VII. 
RECORD TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS 
NOT IN THE NAME OF EDRA JENSEN AND THE FACT 
THAT DEFENDANT EDRA JENSEN WAS AN OCCUPANT 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DOES NOT REQUIRE 
PLAINTIFF TO OBTAIN HER SIGNATURE ON A 
MEMORANDUM OR DOCUMENTS OF CONVEYANCE. 
The second trial court ruled in Conclusion of Law 
no. 3, as follows: 
3. The record deed at the commencement of 
this action was in Edra C. Jensen's name. The 
Defendant, Edra C. Jensen, was in possession of 
the premises and the Plaintiff was on notice of 
her interest. 
It was clearly an error on the part of the lower 
court to determine that record title was in the name of 
Edra c .. Jensen, particularly when the parties 
stipulated that record title was in the name of James 
L. Jensen, and Exhibit 8 so indicates. While 
Exhibit 9, the Warranty Deed from James L. Jensen to 
Edra C. Jensen, was received by the court, the record 
is absolutely clear that neither said deed, nor 
Exhibit 10, the Conditional Sales Agreement between 
Elnora Jensen as seller and James L. Jensen and Edra c. 
Jensen, was of record. Certainly, a prospective 
purchaser is entitled to rely upon record title as 
compared to unrecorded instruments. 
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Admittedly, a prospective purchaser is placed on a 
duty to make inquiry of a prospective seller if other 
parties are occupying the premises in addition to the 
occupant who seeks to sell the property occupied. It 
is submitted that Plaintiff recognized this duty and 
made inquiry as to whom the check should be made 
payable since he was negotiating in the presence of 
both Defendants. Upon making that inquiry, Plaintiff 
was given the Tax Notice on the subject property by 
Edra Jensen, said Tax Notice indicating that the 
property was only taxed in the name of her husband, 
James L. Jensen. By reason of the same, Plaintiff 
testified that he made the check payable only to James 
L. Jensen. 
The trial court apparently found the unrecorded 
warranty deed from James L. Jensen to Edra C. Jensen, 
dated January 15, 1950, and the unrecorded Conditional 
Sales Agreement by and between Elnora Jensen, the 
mother of James L. Jensen, as seller and James L. 
Jensen and Edra c. Jensen, as buyers somehow imparted 
notice to Plaintiff and thus Plaintiff took subject to 
the interest of Edra C. Jensen. 
Utah Code Annotated 57-1-6 provides: 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart 
notice--Operation and effect--Interest 
of person not named in instrument.--
Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of writing setting forth an 
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agreement to convey any real estate or 
whereby any real estate may be affected, 
to operate to notice to third persons 
shall be proved or acknowledged and certi-
fied in the manner prescribed by this title 
and recorded in the off ice of the recorder 
of the county in which such real estate is 
situated, but shall be valid and binding 
between the parties thereto without such 
proofs, acknowledgment, certification or 
record, and as to all other persons who 
have had actual notice .... (Emphasis added). 
The evidence is undisputed that neither the 
warranty deed nor the Uniform Real Estate Contract were 
recorded. Therefore, the issue is whether or not the 
possession of the property by Edra C. Jensen provided 
actual notice to Plaintiff, and if so, what is the 
legal effect of the same. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that the possession of 
the property by Edra C. Jensen required Plaintiff to 
make inquiry of the same. The record is very 
supportive of Plaintiff's position, inasmuch as 
Plaintiff did in fact make inquiry by the following 
exchange found on page 14 and 15 of the Transcript of 
the first trial: 
Q. (by Mr. Chamberlain) and when did you 
have a conversation with Mr. Jensen again? 
A. (by Ned 0. Gregerson) Well, after this 
conversation took place, we met at his house and 
this actually took place, this other meeting took 
place before I met with Don. 
Q. At his house, you mean? 
A. No, the next day we came down early and 
Edra was getting ready to send the kids to school. 
There was my mother and my dad and James was in 
the house and Edra was getting the kids ready for 
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school and she came in and she set down and 
discussed it. They were remodeling their house 
at this time. 
Q. And was there conversation at that time 
concerning this property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you tell us what was said? 
A. We were concerned about the legal 
description and, at this time, that copy we have 
there--
Q. There was a conversation concerning the 
property; is that correct? 
A. You bet, and Mrs. Jensen went and found 
that and this is what she give to me. 
Q. Let me hand you what is Exhibit No. 2 
and I will ask if you can identify that item. 
(Witness looks at exhibit). 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell us what it is. 
A. Valuation Notice for the year 1971, 
where all the property's listed, the whole house. 
Q~ Who gave you that document? 
A. Edra did. 
Q. That document, and did she do it on or 
about September 30, 1971? 
A. That morning. Part of the discussion at 
that time was who was the property named in and 
they didn't know for sure and they pulled this out 
at this time and said--well, they decided this was 
one of the reasons the check should be written to 
James Jensen because that's the name the property 
was in as near as we could tell. 
Utah courts have generally required a prospective 
purchaser to make inquiry concerning other occupants of 
the property. Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 
(1890). However, Utah law, along with practically all 
other jurisdictions, recognize that said duty is 
fulfilled if one makes inquiry of that occupant and is 
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told by that occupant that he or she, as the case may 
be, claims no interest in the property. 
At the time of the conversation as outlined above 
took place, Plaintiff was present, together with his 
father and mother, and both Mr. and Mrs. Jensen were 
present. Apparently Mr. and Mrs. Jensen, at that time 
when the bargain was being struck, failed to remember 
that some 21 years prior to that time, a Warranty Deed 
had been prepared coveying the title from James L. 
Jensen to his wife Edra C. Jensen or that a Conditional 
Sales Agreement was likewise in existence. Therefore, 
Plaintiff did basically what he was told, that is, he 
made the check payable only to "Jay Jensen" and who 
thereafter endorsed it and deposited it into the bank 
account of both Defendants. 
The question then becomes whether or not Plaintiff 
fulfilled the burden imposed upon him in making the 
inquiry so that he becomes a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice as to the interest, if any, of 
Defendant Edra C. Jensen. In the case of Burgess v. 
Independent School District No. 1, 336 P2d 1077 {Okla 
1959), the court went to great lengths to explain first 
of all the duty imposed, and secondly what inquiry must 
be made to meet that burden. In Burgess, Plaintiff 
maintained that the • possession of the property 
constituted actual notice of the property and that the 
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School District failed to make inquiry by reason of 
that fact. The evidence showed that the School 
District did in fact make inquiry and ruled against 
Plaintiff's position. The court in Burgess recited the 
Oklahoma statutes concerning constructive and actual 
notice, and then stated: 
Such statutes imposed on a purchaser 
of real property the duty to inquire 
with reasonable diligence as to the rights 
of anyone, other than the record owner, 
in possession of such property. The duty 
imposed is to make diligent inquiry as 
extinguished from acquiring the correct 
information. 
The trial court found, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed, that the School District made a diligent 
inquiry, and quoted with approval the basic law in this 
particular area: 
. -... 
"When a person has notice of circum-
stances which put him upon inquiry, and 
he actually makes due inquiry into the 
circumstances and either fails to 
discover the existence of any rights in 
conflict with his own or becomes 
satisfied that the suspicions which have 
been awakened are unwarranted, or that a 
change in the circumstances has obviated 
the grounds of his apprehension, he is 
to be regarded as having acted bona fide 
and without notice of the fact ... " 66 
C.J.S. Notice § 11, p. 645 . 
"The presumption or implication of 
notice, based upon the rule heretofore 
stated that notice of facts putting one 
on inquiry would have revealed, is not a 
conclusive one. If it appears that the 
person sought to be charged with notice 
was not heedless of the warning signals, 
but made inquiry and used due diligence 
30 
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to discover the facts of which he had 
knowledge and yet failed to obtain 
knowledge thereof, the inference of 
notice is rebutted and he is not 
affected thereby." 39 Am.Jur. Notice, 
§14. 
"It is a well established, as it would 
seem to be apparent, that diligent but 
fruitless investigation into the 
existence of the facts concerning which 
one is put upon inquiry places the 
unsuccessful questant once more in the 
position of irnmuni ty from notice. In 
the language of Judge Selden in a 
leading case (Williamson v. Brown, 15 
N.Y. 354): 
"The phraseology uniformly used, as 
descriptive of the kind of notice in 
question, sufficient to put the party 
upon inquiry, would seem to imply that 
if the party is faithful in making 
inquiries, but fails to discover the 
conveyance, he will be protected. The 
import of the terms is, that it becomes 
the duty of the party to inquire. If, 
then, he performs that duty is he still 
to be bound, without any actual notice? 
"Hence an instruction that one is 
affected with notice if he has knowledge 
of fact sufficing to put him on inquiry 
is erroneous for its failure to discover 
the effect of inquiry honestly and 
efficiently prosecuted. The therapeutic 
powers of diligent research are 
unimpaired by the facts that the 
information received was inaccurate or 
that the informant did not possess 
complete information concerning the 
motive for the interrogation. As a 
corollary, even though .. · -noJ .. inquiry be 
made, if in fact it would have been 
fruitless, notice does not arise from" 
the knowledge of inquiry-provoking 
circumstan~es. Of course a mere 
assertion of futility will not suffice. 
It must be proved that the questioning 
was barren of results, or that it would 
have been fruitless. In determining the 
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issue of utility or inutility, it must 
be remembered" that the investigator is 
not required to solve close or doubtful 
questions of fact, nor to delve with 
beaverine industry through complex and 
perplexing data." Merrill on Notice, 
sec. 461, p. 423. 
The court in Burgess further recognized that such 
a rule is consistent with recording statutes: 
The primary purpose of the recording 
statutes is to provide means for making 
public all claims of title and interests 
in real property. It is incumbent upon 
persons claiming such interests to see 
that their claim or interest is correctly 
described. Persons who wish to keep their 
interests in lands secret must do so at 
their own peril and not rely upon the cloak 
of the doctrine of constructive notice to 
protect such interests. (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff has addressed previously the fact that 
Edra Jensen did not have any ownership rights in the 
subject property under Point VII. Suffice it to say 
that those same arguments apply to any "possessory" 
rights of Mrs. Jensen. Furthermore, the record is 
lacking of any attempt on the part of Mrs. Jensen where 
she took any immediate steps to repudiate the 
transaction entered into between her husband and 
Plaintiff. 
.... 
Defendant Edra C. Jensen was ( 1) a party to at 
• .. " A . } .. \.. " :._.. ' 
least some of the negotiations; ( 2) produced the Tax 
Notice which indicated her husband's name only; (3) was 
present when the check was delivered and made payable 
to her husband only, and (4) had at least implied 
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notice that the check was deposited to the joint 
account of herself and her husband. Certainly these 
facts and her subsequent silence and acquiesence 
manifests her acceptance of the transaction 
consummated, if she did in fact have any interest in 
the property. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and order the specific enforcement of the 
contract entered into between Gregerson and Jensen, 
using the description provided by the warranty deed 
received by the trial court as evidence at the second 
trial. 
The Court should require the real property to be 
conveyed free and clear of all encumbrances, directing 
Jensen to obtain a Release of Mortgage on the subject 
property. 
DATED this 27th day of May, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
<-1:::a~~/'--
. HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
1 Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
,i. Appellant 
110 North Main St., Suite G 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
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